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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cappaert v. United
States lays the foundation for extensive federal claims to groundwater. In this
Note, Dean Meyers analyzes those federal claims and offers some principles to
resolve the competition between federal and private groundwater users.

FEDERAL GROUNDWATER RIGHTS:
A NOTE ON CAPPAERT V.
UNITED STATES
CharlesJ. Meyers*
I am pleased to contribute this case commentary to a
symposium honoring Frank J. Trelease. One cannot write
on any aspect of water law without drawing on Trelease's
scholarship, and this piece concerns a subject of central
importance in his recent work: federal-state relations in
water law. I have been strongly influenced by his study for
the National Water Commission,1 which remains the basic
text in the area. His call for legislation, valid when made, is
even more urgent today, in view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cappaertv. United States,2 which
lays the foundation for extensive and disruptive federal
claims to groundwater. This Note analyzes those claims and
suggests some principles to resolve the competition between
federal and private groundwater users.
Narrowly stated, the holding in Cappaert is this: A
groundwater user whose withdrawals commenced in 1968
cannot reduce the water level in an inter-connected pool
of surface water on federal land so as to endanger the habitat of a unique species of fish living in the pool, when prior
CopyrightP 1978 by the University of Wyoming.
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to 1968 the pool had been withdrawn from entry by Executive Order, under statutory authority, to preserve its character.
An abstract statement of the "rule" of the case under
this formulation might read as follows: when the Government reserves water for a specific use, uses by others commencing thereafter may not interfere with the prior federal use.
These statements may be accurate but, in my view,
conceal more than they reveal about the controversies the
case will generate. A better statement of the rule of the caseone that foretells the claims that are likely to arise-would be
this: The withdrawal of federal lands from entry and their
reservation for other purposes (such as National Parks, Forests,
Monuments, Wildlife Refuges and, most important, Indian Reservations) reserves groundwater as may be useful to realize
the purposes of the reservation, and the Government (and
its Indian beneficiaries) may pump groundwater, although
the pumping interferes with groundwater use by others.
Moreover, the Government may enjoin groundwater pumping by others if such pumping interferes with Government
use of groundwater for a reservation purpose.
In short, the Government will claim that it is entitled
to harm others by pumping and to prevent harm to itself
from pumping, regardless of contrary provisions of state
law. I shall call these claims the Government's Golden Rule.
The Government's Golden Rule, as derived from Cappaert, is probably subject to one qualification in states applying the law of prior appropriation to groundwater: a
landowner who initiated an appropriative right in groundwater before a federal reservation is withdrawn is entitled to continue his pumping though it harms the Government. For example, if the rancher in Cappaert had obtained his state permit and commenced his pumping in
1950, two years before the Devil's Hole pool was withdrawn
from entry, he could continue to pump pursuant to his
state permit even though fish would die as the water level
in the pool declined. The Government's recourse is condemnation of the rancher's water right. Similarly, if the Governhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/2
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ment pumped water on its reservation so as to interfere with
the rancher's prior appropriative right, the rancher would
have a claim at least for compensation for the taking of a
property right and possibly to an injunction. The Government should not be troubled with this exception to its Golden Rule, for the number of significant pumping operations
that ante-date Government withdrawals is minescule.
While the broad formulation of the Cappaert rule included Indian Reservations, the analysis which follows separates non-Indian federal reserved groundwater rights from
Indian groundwater rights. I have come to the conclusion,
which I attempt to justify at the end of the Note, that
Indian groundwater rights stand on a broader base than
other federal groundwater rights, and in truth owe little,
if anything to Cappaert. But, if this proposition is wrong,
no great harm is done by the separation: one can be sure
that whatever claims, with whatever success, the Government makes for itself in groundwater will be made for the
Indians with no less success.
In speculating over the claims the Government will
make for groundwater and how they will be received by the
federal courts, I begin with the proposition that state law
will have no perceptible influence on the outcome of the
litigation. Federal surface water law ignores the two principal elements of western water law: (1) priority of appropriation and (2) beneficial use. We can expect similar judicial
behavior with respect to groundwater and for similar reasons:
the Government is a late comer and western water law penalizes late comers. If the Government is to be allowed use of
any water-without having to pay for it 3 -the usual state
rule of priority of appropriation must be set aside. Thus, I
expect the federal courts to approach federal groundwater
as tabula rasa and to create a new body of jurisprudence
for it. One way to systematize speculation over the shape
and content of the new jurisprudence is to identify the types
of conflicts that arise over groundwater pumping and to formulate the claims the Government will make against its
opponents in these contests.
3.

There has never been any question of the power of the Government to obtain water; it can always apply for unappropriated water under state law or buy or condemn water already appropriated. The fight is over getting the water for nothing.
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Three kinds of conflicts dominate groundwater litiga4
tion:
(1) Well interference: a new pumper enters an aquifer
with a powerful pump reducing (or terminating) production
from ali older well with a less powerful pump.
(2) Overdraft in rechargeable aquifers: the number of
pumpers in the aquifer and their rate of water withdrawal
is such that the water table steadily declines, increasing
pumping costs (which at some point can become uneconomic) and threatening destruction of the aquifer through
compaction and exhaustion of supply.
(3) Mining a non-recharging aquifer: Production of any
water from a non-recharging aquifer is mining, just as removal
of gold from a vein or oil from a reservoir is mining. When
the water supply is exhausted or falls below economic pumping levels, the economy based on the use of the water will disappear.
Our questions are: (1) What will the Government claim
in these circumstances, both as privileged conduct on its behalf and as breach of duty when engaged in by others? (2)
What is likely to be the response of the federal courts?
Well Interference
The number of cases in this category may turn out to be
limited since federal and private wells are not commonly interspersed in the same aquifer. But conflicts could arise along
the boundaries of federal reservations and in certain other circumstances .5
Cappaert provides the ammunition for an attack on private pumping which interferes with a Government well. The
Government may argue that, if a private pumper cannot
lower the water level in the Devil's Hole Pool, it follows that
a private pumper may not interfere with a Government well.
When a Government well interferes with a private pumper,
7 will be
Winters v. United States6 and Arizona v. California
4.
5.

6.
7.

1 exclude from consideration subsidence and pollution and deal exclusively with
supply.
If alloted Indian lands have passed into non-Indian ownership and if (a big if) such
lands are governed by state water law, the conflict could arise.

207 U.S. 564 (1908).
373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
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wheeled in to support the claim that the Government's conduct is privileged, for those cases hold that the Government is
entitled to take what surface water it needs to fulfill the purposes of a reservation, despite disruption of existing uses. 8
Overdraft in Rechargeable Aquifers
Conventional hydrologic theory holds that rechargeable
aquifers should be operated so as to take advantage of the
storage capacity of the reservoir. While an aquifer may be
drawn down below its natural level, once its optimal level has
been reached, inflow and extraction should balance over
time .9 Some courts have accepted this concept of safe annual
yield as the legal norm for groundwater withdrawals.
When federal and private pumpers are operating in a rechargeable aquifer, two questions may arise: (1) what are the
Government's rights and duties regarding pump depths? (2)
how is safe annual yield to be divided among federal and private pumpers?
The Government may take an extreme position in both
cases: it may claim entitlement to the aquifer in the condition that prevailed when the reservation was established,
which usually will be the natural level. Thus, if water tables
were at fifty feet below the surface when the Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation was established in 1888, the Government
is entitled to stop all pumping (except its own) until that
level is restored. Obviously, less drastic claims are possible:.
the level when the Government sinks its first well; the optimal
level taking into account pumping costs and the value of the
water; or even a sub-optimal level based on general practice
in the state. The basic issue is money: how deep must the
Government drill and how much will it have to pay in lifting
costs? Exactly the same questions arise when the Government is the defendant. Do private pumpers have any protection against Government pumping that lowers the water table
8. Conflicts over well interference--as well as falling water tables and mining of
groundwater-can arise in aquifers in which all pumpers hold federal groundwater
rights. A paradigm case would be litigation among Indians over pumping rights on
the Reservation. In such a case the Government's Golden Rule offers an inadequate
guide to decision, and Government lawyers and federal judges will be forced to
make more complex choices. Later in the Note, I suggest some principles that
ought to apply in litigation between the Government and private pumpers. Those
principles, based on sound groundwater management, are equally applicable here.
9. As benefits and costs change, the optimal water level would also change.
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and increases their drilling and pumping costs? Whatever the
answers may be when the Government is the plaintiff, I think
a negative answer is likely when the Government is the defendant. If the Government proves that groundwater pumping
serves the purposes for which the reservation was established,
a court is unlikely to curtail the Government's pumping because it lowers the water table. The acid test will come when
the Government's pumping is uneconomic but continues because the Government can afford it while the other pumpers
who cannot go out of business.
The other major question of federal rights in rechargeable
aquifers is allocation of safe annual yield when the basin is
subjected to that regimen. I would expect the Government to
claim that its water requirements come off the top, and if
that proves correct, I would also expect the Government to
seek to apply the safe annual yield regimen to all aquifers in
which it has an interest. After the Government's requirements
are satisfied, any remaining supply would be allocated among
private pumpers according to state law. In appropriation
states, junior pumpers could very well be shut down.
Mining a Non-rechargingAquifer
Few, if any, aquifers have literally zero recharge; but,
quite a number are functionally non-recharging because the
rate of recharge is measured in decades or centuries. The
Ogallala aquifer, which underlies parts of Texas, Oklahoma,
Kansas and Nebraska is a well-known example of a functionally non-recharging aquifer.
Of course, a non-recharging aquifer has no safe annual
yield; to produce water from it is to mine. Whether or not to
mine and, if so, at what rate, are the questions facing the
manager of such a basin. The Government could make a plausible claim that it alone may produce water from a nonrecharging basin. If groundwater is useful in accomplishing
the purpose of the reservation, then the depletion of the resource by other pumpers frustrates those purposes and violates the Government's right.
Consider this case: both federal and private users are
pumping from a closed aquifer. At present rates of extraction,
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/2
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the aquifer will be exhausted in twenty years, but if the private pumpers are shut down the aquifer will produce for
forty years. We can expect the Government to contend that
its superior right entitles it to the aquifer's full supply because the full supply is necessary (or useful) to accomplish
the purposes of the reservation.
RECAPITULATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S CLAIMS:
SOME ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION

The Government's Golden Rule when applied to specific
groundwater conflicts is likely to produce the following claims
on behalf of the Government as plaintiff:
(1) It may enjoin private wells that interfere with Government wells.
(2) It has a protected legal interest in pump depths, possibly the depth in a state of nature, probably a depth no lower than that of the Government's first well.
(3) Safe annual yield is the limit on extraction from recharging aquifers and the Government takes its requirements
off the top.
(4) The Government alone can pump from non-recharging aquifers.
When the Government is the defendant, the correlative
propositions derived from the Government's Golden Rule are:
(1) No private pumper is protected from well interference by Government pumping.
(2) The Government's draw down of water tables is unlimited.
(3) If safe annual yield is the limit on extraction of water
from an aquifer, private pumpers receive what remains after
Government requirements are fully satisfied.
(4) Private pumpers cannot extract water from a nonrecharging aquifer if the Government objects.
I do not have the knowledge and imagination to predict
the magnitude of havoc these claims will produce. It seems
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1977
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clear, however, that if sustained, they will destroy existing
private investment' in groundwater operations in aquifers
where the Government has an interest.
I see two arguments in opposition to the Government's
claims, though both run into some trouble from the Court's
language in Cappaert. The first argument relates to the intent
that existed when the reservation was established. Winters v.
United States and Arizona v. California hold that a right to
surface water may be reserved for federal purposes when a
reservation is established, because an inference may be drawn
from the stated purposes of the reservation and surrounding
circumstances that surface water was required for their accomplishment. The inference is quite strong for Indian Reservations, because the Indians were expected to become farmers
and needed water to do so. The inference may be less strong
for some other federal reservations (e.g., a National Forest)
because their need for a water right was not self-evident. National Forests use water of course, but typically they are
sources of water and do not now, and did not when created,
need a water right in order to accomplish their purpose of
sustaining arboreal life.
The Government's response might be: this argument was
plausible before 1963, but since then, Arizona v. California
has declared that National Parks, Monuments, Forests, Wildlife Refuges, etc. are entitled to water rights. The inference of
intent to reserve water was so lightly made that the presumption is in favor of a reserved water right and opponents must
prove a contrary intent.
The Government response would be overstated. The sole
statement in Arizona v. California on non-Indian reserved water rights is in its entirety this:
The Master ruled that the principle underlying the
reservation of water rights for Indian Reservations
was equally applicable to other federal establishments
such as National Recreation Areas and National Forests. We agree with the conclusions of the Master that
the United States intended to reserve water sufficient
for the future requirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National Wildlife
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol13/iss2/2
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Refuge, the Imperial 10National Wildlife Refuge and the
Gila National Forest.
The Decree quantified the water rights of the two Wildlife Refuges, whose need for water is self-evident, but did not
quantify the right of either the Recreation Area or the National Forest. For further guidance we must turn to the Master's
Report, which makes three points about the Recreation
Area:" (1) The Government had the power to reserve Colorado River water for the Recreation Area; (2) The Government intended to reserve water because the Recreation Area's
purposes could not be fully carried out without the water;
(3) quantification of future requirements is unnecessary because the general order of magnitude is the same as present
uses, 300 acre feet per year.
The same points are made again about the National Forest, and the Master concludes as follows: "As in the case of
the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the future water requirements of the Gila National Forest appear to be so modest
that it is unnecessary to put maximum limits on the reserved
water rights created for its benefit." 2
I conclude from the scant attention paid to non-Indian
federal reservations by both the Supreme Court and the Special Master in Arizona v. California that while the power to
reserve water for federal reservations is not in doubt (and
never was), intent is still an arguable proposition and that
trivial amounts of water require little proof of intent, but
that large quantities of water will require correspondingly
greater proof.
I also suggest that non-Indian federal reservations which
have an adequate supply of surface water to satisfy reservation purposes may not have any groundwater right at all. If
intent is an element in the creation of a federal reserved water right, that intent has been effectuated when a reservation's
requirements are supplied by a surface water right. It seems
highly improbable that groundwater was intended to be reserved at a time when surface water was available to satisfy
10. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
11. Master's Report, Arizona v. California, at 292-94 (1960).
12. Id. at 335.
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reservation needs and when groundwater use was non-existent
or limited to trivial domestic uses.
Neither the holding nor the language in Cappaert forecloses this approach to federal groundwater rights. Although
in its general discussion of reserved water rights the Court's
language suggests that a withdrawal of land from entry automatically reserves appurtenant water, 18 the Court later holds
that "the water right reserved by the 1952 Proclamation was
thus explicit, not implied." 1 4
Moreover, the Court specifically notes that quantity is
tied to need and need is tied to purpose."5 This language, especially the phrase "minimal need", allows room for the contention that groundwater is reserved only if groundwater, qua
groundwater, is necessary to accomplish the reservation purposes, as it was for the pupfish in Devil's Hole.
Instances will occur, however, where the intent to reserve
groundwater should be inferred from the purposes of the reservation and the circumstances at the time of the withdrawal.
Accordingly, conflicts between federal and private pumpers
will have to be adjudicated. Some better norm than the Government's Golden Rule is needed. The Government should be
entitled to use some groundwater, even if it is the last pumper
in the basin. But, the Government should not be allowed to
destroy existing capital investments (e.g., by closing down a
non-recharging aquifer) to save pumping costs or extend the
life of the aquifer solely for its own benefit.
Statutory authority is needed to appoint a basin manager
for aquifers in which the Government has an interest. The
manager should be given the power and the responsibility to
administer the basin in accordance with modern techniques
of aquifer management. 6 The key element of the statute,
13. Cappaert v. United States, supra note 2, at 138.
14. Id. at 140.
15. "Thus, as the District Court has correctly determined, the level of the pool may be
permitted to drop to the extent that the drop does not impair the scientific value
of the pool as the naturalhabitat of the species sought to be preserved. The District
Court thus tailored its injunction, very appropriately, to minimal need, curtailing
pumping only to the extent necessary to preserve an adequate water level at Devil's
Hole, thus implementing the stated objectives of the Proclamation." Id. at 141
(emphasis added).
16. This Note is no place to discuss proper standards of groundwater management. The
interested reader will find a useful introduction to the subject in the NATIONAL
WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230-43 (1973).
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however, would be a provision treating federal pumpers like
private pumpers. I advocate Congressional rejection of the extreme Government claims, the institution of a sound groundwater management regimen, and the treatment of all pumpers
as equals, with the same rules on well interference, pump
lifts, division of safe annual yield, and right to mine. I do not
advocate application of state law, because state law might
forbid government pumping altogether (e.g., in a basin already
closed by the State Engineer) or impose other restrictions
that would interfere with reservation purposes. The groundwater law should be federal law, but it ought to be a fair federal law under which the Government is simply another competitor for the resource.
The likelihood of Congressional action along this, or any
other line, is remote. What then should the federal courts do
when presented with conflicting federal and private groundwater claims? They have no choice, it seems to me, but to
construct some system of federal groundwater law, and they
are free to develop a fair system that seeks to maximize the
total social gain from the resource while accommodating the
competing interests in distributing the resource. They are free
to reject the Government's Golden Rule and adopt a system
that is economically sound and distributionally fair.
The one hurdle in this path is language in Cappaert stating that the doctrine of federally reserved water rights does
not involve a "balancing test." 17 I believe the obstacle can be
overcome: the Court's language responds to a contention of
the State of Nevada that the Supreme Court "in the Winters
case was undoubtedly weighing the conflicting equities...";
that "[t] he doctrine that grew out of the Winters case was a
doctrine of need, an equitable doctrine."' 18
This is a preposterous argument, which the Court sees,
not incorrectly, as an invitation to overrule Arizona v. California and the Eagle County case. 19 In response, the Court
rejects the proposed "balancing of the equities" test, but the
rejection goes only to the creation of the federal reserved
right, not to its ambit. The opinion makes clear that intent to
17. Cappaert v. United States, supra note 2, at 138; see also Id. at 139 n.4.
18. Brief for Intervenor-Appelant State of Nevada, p. 15.
19. United States v. District Court for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
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reserve water can be an issue and that the issue is resolved in
terms of the need for a water right to accomplish reservation
purposes. It also states that the amount of water reserved depends on need, indeed "minimal need. 2 0° It rejects a balancing test to determine whether a reserved right was created; it
does not reject a rule of reason in adjudicating and administering conflicting claims on well interference, pump depths,
21
safe annual yield or mining groundwater.
Indian GroundwaterRights
I am unsure how much of the foregoing analysis applies
to Indian groundwater rights. Early readings of Cappaert led
me to believe that just as Indian water rights under Winters
provided the foundation for federal reserved water rights on
non-Indian reservations, federal groundwater rights on a National Monument under Cappaertwould provide the basis for
Indian groundwater rights.
I no longer hold that view. I would argue that when an
Indian Reservation was created, whether by treaty, statute or
executive order, a property interest comparable to a fee simple absolute was set aside in trust for the tribe. The Indians
own the beneficial interest in all the resources on their land:
soil, oil and gas, coal, other minerals and groundwater.
If this conceptualization is accepted, then Indian groundwater rights are different in one important respect from nonIndian federal reserved groundwater rights: the question of
intent to reserve does not arise. Equitable title to the groundwater passed to the tribe in precisely the same manner as title
passed to the land and its other resources.
But the conflicts over use of the resource between Indian
and non-Indian pumpers are no different from those between
federal and private pumpers. The Indians are likely to claimand to receive-all the protections afforded the Government,
and unlike the Government's non-Indian groundwater claims,
Congressional solutions are probably not tenable in theory,
20.
21.

Cappaert v. United States, supra note 2, at 141.
Nevada's Brief is not the first instance of extreme claims backfiring. In Ivanhoe Irr.

Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 292 (1958), the district contended that Section
8 of the Reclamation Law, directing the Secretary to comply with state water law,
nullified the 160-acre limitation of Section 5 of the Reclamation Law. The Supreme Court properly rejected that preposterous argument and in doing so began
the process that eviscerated Section 8.
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even if available in fact. As to its own proprietary claims, the
United States by legislative action can surrender what a court
has awarded it. As to Indian claims, apart from condemnation and indemnification, only a court can define the rights
and privileges in groundwater and only the Indians can surrender them.
The Indians can be expected to press for every advantage
and the outcome can be considerably more significant to
non-Indian interests than Indian rights in surface water have
been. While Indian Reservations have surface water claims
that could absorb the full supply of many rivers, those claims
(even when adjudicated and placed in a decree) do not mean
much until investment capital is available to build projects to
use the water.? Until quite recently, an Indian water project,
meant an irrigation project and since most irrigation projects
(Indian or non-Indian) are uneconomical, the only source of
capital was the federal government. Under those circumstances, the political process limited public investment in Indian projects.
Groundwater development requires less capital and is,
therefore, less inhibited by the political process. Thus, we can
anticipate more rapid development of Indian groundwater
than of Indian surface water, resulting in direct conflicts with
non-Indian users, the resolution of which will have immediate
and palpable effects on the non-Indian users.
To my mind, a rule of reason is also appropriate in adjudicating Indians' claims on well interference, pump depths,
safe annual yield and groundwater mining. While the Indians'
source of title differs from other Government groundwater
rights, characterizing the Indians' rights as derived from a
grant of a fee simple absolute does not resolve the competition between Indians and non-Indians, who also have a fee
simple absolute in their overlying land. The federal courts
should apply sound management principles and precedures
to the aquifer, seeking to maximize its productivity and distribute its wealth so that Indians receive a share without destroying prior non-Indian investment.
22.

Indian Reservations in the Lower Colorado River Basin were decreed nearly one

million acre feet of water in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), but the
decreed rights have had no noticeable effect on the supply of non-Indian users.
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